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mined that the balancing test was in- alluding to the prosecutor's "right" to
tended to apply to both infamous crimes impeach by prior conviction and by
and crimes affecting witness credibil- failing to inquire about the date of the
ity. Id at 271,619 A.2dat 109. Sec- theft conviction. Id
Finally, the court of appeals found
ond, the court considered the legislative
history underlying the adoption of the that thetrialjudge's error was not harmrule to determine the drafters' intent. It less. It held that because of the factual
found that the Standing Committee on nature of the arguments from both parRules of Practice and Procedure sought ties, thejury's verdict depended primato replace the old, dangerously rigid rily on its perception of the witnesses'
rule, by establishing a "broadly-ap- credibility. Id at 275, 619 A.2d at Ill.
plied" balancing test to limit the admis- Furthermore, it noted that due to the
difficulty in determining credibility,
sibility of all prior convictions. Id
Next, the court acknowledged the harmless error analysis would require
differences between the new Maryland the court to speculate as to what weight
rule and the federal rule on impeach- the jury assigned to Lawrence's testiment by prior conviction. The court mony. The court, therefore, could not
noted that the federal rule provides for find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
automatic admission of crimes of dis- trial judge's error was harm1ess. Achonesty or falsehood and is, therefore, cordingly, it remanded the case to the
quite inflexible. Id at273,619A.2dat circuit court for a new trial.
Beales v. State represents the first
110 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2».
Alternatively, the Maryland rule re- attempt by the Court of Appeals of
quires a preliminary balancing test for Maryland to interpret the new Maryall prior conviction evidence. The court land Rule 1-502 governing impeachconcluded that requiring the trial court ment of witnesses by prior conviction.
to use the balancing test for both types As interpreted, Rule 1-502 gives the
of prior convictions is more consistent trial court considerably broader discrewith the State of Maryland's policy of tion in ruling on the admission of this
permitting courts to regulate the admis- type of impeachment evidence. Besibility of all evidence. Beales, 329 calise the trial judge hears all the testiMd. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110.
mony and experiences witness demeanor
In applying its interpretation of Rule first hand, this discretion will probably
1-502 to the facts before it, the court of lead to more equitable results. Moreappeals recognized the strong presump- over, although a bright-line rule may
tion in favor ofupholding the trial court's provide notice as to the admissibility of
decision. Nevertheless, after reviewing prior convictions for impeachment of
the record as a whole, the court decided witnesses, this rule will give opponents
that the trial judge had failed to ad- of the impeachment evidence greater
equately weigh the probative value capacity to argue against its admissibilagainst the risk of unfair prejudice in ity. As a result of this decision, Rule 1admitting the evidence of Lawrence's 502 will lead to increasing amounts of
prior conviction for theft, as required testimony and greater weight given to
by Rule 1-502. Id at 274, 619 A.2d at the testimony of witnesses or parties
110. The trial judge had demonstrated with prior criminal convictions.
his unawareness of the new rule by
-Kelly A. Casper

Rosenberg v. Helinski: A WITNESS
MAY REITERATE THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS TESTIMONY TO
JOURNALISTS OUTSIDE A
COURTROOM, AND HIS REMARKS REMAIN LEGALLY
PRIVILEGED.

In Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md.
664, 616A.2d 866 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland addressed a case
of first impression regarding the issue
of whether remarks made to reporters
outside a courtroom by a witness are
privileged. The court held that the
psychologist's remarks concerning his
expert testimony at a child abuse hearing, even though defamatory to the
father's personal reputation, are absolutely privileged, and the psychologist
is protected from liability.
The instant case arose out of a divorce hearing before the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County wherin Mr.
Helinski requested unsupervised visitation with his two-year old daughter.
Mrs. Helinski opposed his request; alleging that Mr. Helinski had sexually
abused the child. As evidence of the
abuse, Mrs. Helinski offered the expert
testimony of a pediatrician at
Baltimore's Mercy Hospital, who testified that the child had a well-healed scar
which was diagnostic of a sexual abuse
injury. Holding that there was no connection linking the child's injury to Mr.
Helinski, the trial court granted the
divorce, and allowed Mr. Helinski
unsupervised visitation with his daughter.
Despite the court's ruling, Mrs.
Helinski denied visitation of the child to
Mr. Helinski, and the couple appeared
again in a hearing before the Circujt
Court for Baltimore County. At this
hearing, Mrs. Helinski offered the testimony ofLeon Rosenberg, Ph.D., a child
psychologist and associate professor of
medical psychology and pediatrics at
Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine. Dr. Rosenberg'S testimony
was offered to prove that the abuse had
occurred, and as a result, Mr. Helinski
should not have unsupervised visitation
23.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 29

of the child.
Dr. Rosenberg testified that he had
evaluated the child three times, and
included in his evaluation the report of
the pediatrician who had initially examined the child, as well as that of a Child
Protective Services social worker who
had interviewed the child. The basis of
his testimony was that the child expressed fear of her father because he
had hurt her in the genital area and was
afraid of being hu rt there again, and that
Rosenberg believed the child was "honest and spontaneous" and not coached.
At the end of the hearing, Dr.
Rosenberg was confronted on the courthouse steps by a television camera crew
and a Baltimore station WJZ
newswoman who asked him questions
regarding the case. The only record of
the conversation was the two minute
and fifteen second story which aired
that evening on the six 0' clock local
ncws. ll1estory "identified the Helinskis
by name," incorporated artist's courtroom sketches of Rosenberg and the
parties, as well as stated the allegations
made by Mrs. Helinski that were ultimately confinned by Dr. Rosenberg in
his on-camera il)terview. The story also
contained three statements of Dr.
Rosenberg wherein he reaffinned his
testimony regarding his evaluation of
the child's injury.
As a result of the newscast, Mr.
Helinski brought a defamation action
against Dr. Rosenberg in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City. Dr.
Rosenberg subsequently filed a motion
for summary judgment. The court,
granting Dr. Rosenberg's motion, held
that "Rosenberg's comments were protected by the privilege given to those
who recount in-court testimony." Mr.
Helinski appealed, and the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed
and remanded the case to the circuit
court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently granted Dr.
Rosenberg's petition for certiorari, and
reversed the decision of the court of
special appeals.
First, the court of appeals held that
in order to recover for defan1ation, the
30 - U. Bait. L.F.l23.3

plaintiff must establish that the defendant made the defamatory. statement,
which was false, to a third person, that
the defendant was legally at fault, and
that the plaintiff suffered harm.
Rosenberg v. Helinski. 328 Md. 664,
675,616 A.2d 866,871 (1992) (citing
Hearst Corporation v. Hughes. 297
Md. 112, 120-125, 466 A.2d 486,
(1983». The court found that Dr.
Rosenberg's statements to the reporters
were defamatory, as they tended "to
expose [Mr. Helinski] to public scorn,
hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby
discouraging others ... from having a
good opinion ... of [him]." Rosenberg.
328 Md. at675, 616 A.2dat872 (quoting Batson v. Sh~flett, 325 Md. 684,
722-23, 602 A.2d 1191 (1992». The
cou rt of appeals held, however, that the
general rule in Maryland is that "statements made by a witness during the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, and ... cannot serve
as the basis for an action in dcfamation." Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 676,616
A.2d at 872 (citing Odyniec v.
Schneider. 322 Md. 520,526,588 A.2d
786 (1991». Moreover, the witness is
protected by this absolute privilege even
if the statement was false, the motive
malicious, or unreasonable. Rosenberg.
328 Md. at 676, 616 A.2d at 872 (quoting Odyniec v. Schneider. 322 Md. at
527, 588 A.2d 786).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
examined the reasons for this absolute
privilege from liability, and found that
the "need for witnesses to speak freely
in court, without intimidation by the
possibility ofcivil liability" outweighed
a person's right to bring a defamation
action against the witness for statements made by the same witness while
testifying. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 677,
616 A.2d at 872, (quoting Odyniec v.
Schneider. 322 Md. at 528, 588 A.2d
786».
The court also address~d the lesser,
conditional privilege given to people
who report "in-court proceedings containing defamatory material" if the reports are "fair and substantially correct
or substantially accurate accounts of

what took place." Rosenberg. 328
Md. at 677,616 A.2d at 872 (quoting
McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 417, 426
(1878». The privilege from liability,
however, is conditional upon the report
being found fair and substantially correct. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 678, 616
A.2d at 873 (citing Brush-Moore
Newsp. v. Pollitt. 220 Md. 132,138,
151 A.2d 530 (1959». The court of
appeals applied the conditional privilege to Dr. Rosenberg'$ statements to
the news media, and found that Dr.
Rosenberg had acted as an agent, and
"recounted events at ajudicial hearing
[which was] entirely open to the public." Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 680,616
A.2dat 873-74. The court held that Dr.
Rosenberg could invoke this conditional
privilege, due to the fact that journalists
as well as non-journalists are treated
the same under the Constitution with
respect to potential liability for defamation when exercising their First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 680,
616 A.2d at 874 (quoting Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. 472U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (White,J.,
concurring) (First Amendment gives no
more protection to the press that it does
to others exercising their freedom of
speech».
In concluding the aforementioned,
the court recognized that this case can1e
down to whether Dr. Rosenberg's statements to the news media were fair and
accurate. Finding that Dr. Rosenberg's
statements were virtually identical to
his prior testimony and the fact he reported to the media about his testimony
and the "most significant substance of
the hearing" lead the court to conclude
that the statements were accurate and
fair. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 681-82,
616 A.2d at 874-75.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
however, added a caveat to the "fair
reporting privilege." The person making the statement "cannot confer this
privilege upon himself by making the
original defamatory [statement], and
then reporting to other people what he
hadstated." Id. at684,616A.2dat876
(quoting Restatement (Second) ofTorts

§ 611, cmt. c). The court found that this
caveat did not apply to Dr. Rosenberg
because there was nothing in the record
to suggest that he intended in bad faith
to harm Mr. Helinski by his testimony
or the statements made to the news
media. Dr. Rosenberg testified as an
expert witness and his statements to the
news media ~'accurately and fairly recounted the substance of his testimony." Rosenberg, 328 Md. at
686, 616 A.2d at 877.
Rosenberg v. Helinski is significant
because the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed an issue which is certain
to arise again; the right of the public to
reports ofjudicial proceedings, and the
legal privilege extended to those who
make fair and accurate reports.
-Bonnie S. Laakso

Dawson v. State: ENFORCEMENT
OF STATE'S DRUG-FREE
SCHOOL ZONE STATUJE DURING NON-SCHOOL HOURS
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.

ute, violated the equal protection clauses
of both the United States Constitution
and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Dawson argued that the statute's objective of protecting children from exposure to drug activities was not served by
In Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, its imposition of criminal liability dur619 A.2d 111 (1993), the Court of ing non-school hours. The court exAppeals ofMaryland upheld the consti- plained that Dawson was alleging a
tutionalityofthestate'sdrug-freeschool "direct" substantive due process chalzone statute, which prohibits the distri- lenge by claiming that the statute was
bution of controlled dangerous sub- not reasonably related to the goal it
stances within 1,000 feet ofa school's intended to serve and that in the face of
perimeter. After reviewing whether the such a claim, a determination must be
statute's objective of protecting chil- made whether the statute ". bears a real
dren from the dangers ofthe drug trade and substantial relation to the public
is constitutionally achieved by the health, morals, safety, and welfare of
statute's broad imposition of criminal the citizens of this state. '" Dawson,
liability on offenders during non-school 329Md. at283, 619 A.2dat 115 (quothours, the court found that the statute ing Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274
does not offend the due process require- Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683
ments of either the United States Con- (1975». If this test is satisfied, the
stitution or the Maryland Constitution. statute will be upheld.
During the course of an undercover
In applying this test to § 286D, the
drug operation in Harford County, court first examined the statutory lancounty deputies purchased a quarter- guage and found that the statute was
gram of cocaine from Stacey Eugene aimed at decreasing schoolchildren's
Dawson ("Dawson"). The transaction drug use and enriching their educaoccurred within 1,000 feet of Halls tional environment by creating a drugCross Elementary School, at approxi- free school zone. Dawson, 329 Md. at
mately 9:30 p.m. After the sale, a 285,619 A.2d at 116. In addition, the
uniformed officer returned to the scene court determined that the statute sought
to limit schoolchildren's exposure to
and arrested Dawson.
Dawson was indicted by the Grand the negative environment and crime
Jury for Harford County for unlawful associated with the drug trade by shielddistribution of a controlled dangerous ing them from such activity. Id. In light
substance, under Md. Ann. Code art. of these purposes, the court rejected
27, § 286(a)(1)(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Dawson's substantive due process chaland for unlawful distribution of a con- lenge and found that a twenty-four hour
trolled dangerous substance within prohibition against drug activity in
1,000 feet of school property, under school zones was a legitimate method of
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 286D ("§ accomplishing the statute's purposes.
286D"). A jury in the Circuit Court for . Id.
Harford County found Dawson guilty
The court next considered Dawson's
on both counts. Dawson appealed to argument that the drug-free school zone
the Court of Special Appeals of Mary- statute was overbroad due to its impoland, but prior to its review of the case, sition of criminal liability during nonthe Court of Appeals of Maryland school hours. Dawson, 329 Md. at286,
granted certiorari.
619 A.2d at 116. The court, however,
After first rejecting Dawson's con- rejected Dawson's characterization of
tention that the evidence was insuffi- both school ground activities and the
cient to convict him, the court focused drug market, and found that the preson Dawson's argument that § 286D, ence of children in school areas is not
Maryland's drug-free school zone stat- predictable, particularly in light of the
23.3/U. BaIt. L.F. - 31

